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1994-05-02
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<text>
<title>
Ruble Convertibility and a Stabilization Fund
</title>
<article>
<hdr>
CRS Review, August 1992
Ruble Convertibility and a Stabilization Fund
</hdr>
<body>
<p>By Patricia A. Wertman, specialist in international trade and
finance, CRS Economics Division
</p>
<p> A currency stabilization fund has been proposed to ease
Russia's transition to a market economy and its integration
into the world economy. Currency stabilization funds buy and
sell currency in support of a particular foreign exchange rate.
They are used to counter short-term currency volatility that is
not justified by underlying economic fundamentals. Currency
stabilization funds may be used by countries that already have a
fully convertible currency such as the United States, or by
countries instituting convertibility.
</p>
<p>Convertibility: Advantages and Disadvantages
</p>
<p> Convertibility has advantages and risks. There are at least
two major potential advantages for Russia: by linking domestic
prices to world market prices, it would help to establish a
domestic pricing system; and it would facilitate trade and
investment.
</p>
<p> Convertibility may also have a major disadvantage: if
macroeconomic stabilization is not adequate, it may result in
substantial "capital flight," which overtly signals a lack of
confidence in government policies and deprives the economy of
needed investment finds. Capital flight can deplete the fund.
Indeed, not using a stabilization fund is a measure of
successful currency stabilization.
</p>
<p>Currency Stabilization
</p>
<p> Russia lacks international reserves of its own that it might
use for currency stabilization, so Russia's stabilization fund
will be created from $6.0 billion loaned to Russia by the
International Monetary Fund. The IMF will, in turn, obtain the
necessary funds, including $1.5 billion from the United States,
by borrowing from the major industrial countries under a set of
medium-term credit lines established in 1962, the so-called
General Arrangements to Borrow (GAB).
</p>
<p> Two meaningful "hurdles" are likely to determine the timing
of the activation of the GAB for Russia. One is the negotiation
of an IMF standby credit involving macroeconomic
conditionality. Ruble stabilization will require a
well-controlled monetary policy, including realistic interest
rates and control over excess credit creation. Conditions of
cooperation must be established between the Russian central bank
and the central banks of those republics that are likely to
remain in the ruble zone. Replacement of the ruble by Ukraine,
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and the three Baltic republics,
all of which are already planning to issue their own currencies,
must also be negotiated. Russia's budget deficit must also be
brought under better control to avoid rapid inflation.
</p>
<p> The other major hurdle for establishment of the ruble
stabilization fund is determination of a realistic exchange
rate for the ruble. Beginning July 1, the Russian ruble will
become convertible on current account with a single exchange
rate (the current amount of a country's balance of international
payments is the net balance arising from exports and imports of
goods and services, together with unilateral transfers). The
ruble will be allowed to "float"--that is, its price will be
determined by market supply and demand. Eventually, the ruble
will be fixed to the dollar, with a range of fluctuation of +/-
7.5%. The government hopes to peg the rate at Rbs 80 per U.S.
dollar, up from its July 2 auction rate of about Rbs 135 per
dollar. In dollar value terms, this represents a drastic
appreciation of nearly 70 percent. The course to ruble
convertibility thus is not likely to be smooth.
</p>
</body>
</article>
</text>